Purpose: The aim of this paper is to investigate the association of earnings quality with corporate performance of publicly listed firms of China and tries to provide a new explanation. Poor earnings quality is normally characterized by unhealthy profitability and/or untrue financial information, which leads to a misallocation of capital and low corporate performance. The largest emerging economy of China has experienced a fast and fluctuant growth, while the companies have been thought of low earnings quality.
Introduction
Earnings quality has drawn a great deal of attention from academics and entrepreneurs because it incorporates much more information on corporate operations and financial reporting, and may consequently impact corporate performance. Two types of definition of earnings quality are frequently referenced. One type of definition concerns the degree to which the quantity of earnings reflects a firm's economic reality (Dechow and Schrand, 2004; Chan et al., 2006; Hodge 2003) . In other words, earnings quality denotes that the financial statement reports accurately and impartially the firm's corporate operating status and financial position. In this definition, a close match between earnings and cash flow is viewed as high quality, because earnings may be manipulated by inflating accruals. The other type of definition recognizes earnings quality as the degree to which earnings persist or are sustained into the next period (Richardson et al., 2005 (Richardson et al., , 2006 Revsine et al. 1999) . In this definition, high variation and volatility of earnings is viewed as low quality, because earnings uncertainty is a risk for corporate operation and adds to the cost of capital.
The relevant literature claims that having high-quality earnings is a desirable trait in companies. Poor earnings quality is characterized by unhealthy profitability and/or untrue financial information, and is thus detrimental to investors and other users of financial statements. Low-quality earnings can lead to a misallocation of capital, and may generate inappropriate outcomes for contracts that use accounting data as inputs (Schipper and Vincent 2003) . Low-quality earnings also introduce an information risk to investors, and thereby increase the cost of capital (Francis et al. 2004 ). The positive relationship between earnings quality and corporate performance is theoretically proved.
However, empirical result seems not always to provide evidence that high earnings quality is associated with high corporate performance and vice versa. Chan et al. (2006) examine the market valuation of earnings quality. They find that increased earnings accompanied by high accruals suggest low earnings quality. Penman and Zhang (2002) document that growth firms in sales or net operating assets are accompanied with lower earnings quality. In this research on Chinese publically listed firms, we find that earnings quality in majority measures has negative relations with corporate performance. We argue that this negative association can be explained by the following theoretical insight.
Regardless of the various definitions of earnings quality, several measures have been popularly employed in examining it: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, earnings smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism (Francis et al., 2004; Dechow et al., 2010) . The earnings quality measures can be estimated by either use of firm-year specific time series regression or use of industry-based cross-sectional regression.
Both methods are constructed on the principle of generating benchmark earnings for the calculation of earnings variations or estimated errors.
The deviation from reported earnings to the benchmark earnings consists of two components, represented by the formula: reported earnings -benchmark earnings = (reported earnings -real earnings) + (real earnings -benchmark earnings). One component is the difference between reported earnings and real earnings, which results from reporting accuracy. The other is the difference between real earnings and the benchmark, which results from a firm's operating outcome. Dechow et al. (2010) state that earnings quality is jointly determined by the relevance of underlying fundamental performance and by the ability of the accounting system to measure performance. Thus, we contend that any test of earnings quality using the aforementioned measures is a joint test of the firm's fundamental performance and financial reporting accuracy.
The benchmark earnings generated by the models are treated as desirable, because when the deviation from the reported earnings to the benchmark earnings is small, the earnings quality is deemed to be high; otherwise the earnings quality is deemed to be low. If we ignore the question of the rationale for benchmark earnings being desirable unconditionally, the earnings quality is only relevant to reported earnings. However, the reported earnings are a joint function of corporate operation and financial reporting, which determine earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010) .
On the corporate operating side, either significant revenue increases or decreases or fluctuates will lead to actual earnings deviation from benchmark earnings. Those sorts of earnings are uncertain, less predictable, low persistence and showing low quality. On the financial reporting side, significant increased accruals (represented as discretionary accruals) can either result from the growth of sales and preparation for the growth of sales or from earnings management that uses accruals to inflate and smooth earnings.
In the new emerging market of China, the mainstream of firms has remarkable expansion in production and sales. This can be observed from the growth of the national economy at a rate of 10% on average in the past ten years. Yet, earnings quality has been recognized as low due to uneven expansion of production and possible earnings management.
We argue that low earnings quality could be a by-product of the fast growth of the economy in an emerging market. The upward trend of the economy dominates the negative effect of earnings volatility and reporting inaccuracy. Thus low earnings quality can be accompanied by high corporate performance.
Keeping this argument in mind, we investigate the relations between earnings quality and corporate performance for firms publicly listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2004 to 2010. Firstly, by using accounting-based measures of corporate performance, our empirical results indeed show that low earnings quality is associated with high corporate performance. Next, we eliminate the possible earnings management component from the corporate performance. The unmanaged corporate performance is still negatively associated with earnings quality, although the significance is slightly lower.
Furthermore, we classify companies as having earnings-increase management and earningsdecrease management. The negative association of earnings quality with corporate performance is found in both classes of companies. Finally, we employ market-based measures of corporate performance in the robustness tests. The negative association of earnings quality with corporate performance is still estimated on several earnings quality measures, although there is one exception. We also compare the earnings quality and firm performance of financially distressed firms with those of normal firms. The earnings quality and firm performance of financially distressed firms are significantly lower than those of normal firms.
To the best of our knowledge, we are extending the literature by conducting a systematic study of the relation between earnings quality and corporate performance for Chinese listed firms. The contribution of this research is that we are the first to claim, and provide evidence, that earnings quality is negatively associated with corporate performance in the new emerging market of China. If judged according to the mainstream opinion of the existing literature, that earnings quality is positively associated with corporate performance, our findings may seem unusual. We argue, with our further evidence, that the association of low earnings quality with high corporate performance is probably an inherent phenomenon of emerging markets. The fast and fluctuating growth is a main driver of the coexistence of low earnings quality and high corporate performance in emerging markets such as China.
Emerging markets are a large component of the world market. Identifying the phenomena that characterize an emerging market, or the emerging period of a market, would rich emerging market literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and describes institutional background. Section 3 develops the measures of earnings quality and corporate performance. Section 4 presents and analyses the empirical results generated from various modellings. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature and research hypotheses
No consensus exists in the literature about the concept of earnings quality. Dechow and Schrand (2004) state that a high-quality earnings number accurately reflects a company's current operating performance and is a good indicator of future operating performance.
Financial statements will be less useful when the reported accounting earnings do not reflect the firm's financial activity throughout the reporting period (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) . Dechow and Schrand (2004) also indicate that high-quality earnings should be easily convertible into cash. This represents a high correlation between earnings and cash flow and low accruals volatility. Brown (1967, 1968) contend that high earnings quality should be valued on the equity market. Thus, they use market responses to earnings news to refer to earnings quality. Schipper and Vincent (2003) view earnings quality in relation to Hicksian income, that is the maximum amount that can be consumed consistent with the maintenance of wealth.
According to Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2004) , high-quality earnings are more informative to the long-run value of the firm. Revsine et al. (1999) consider that earnings are of higher quality when they are sustainable. Richardson et al. (2005) treat earnings quality as the degree to which earnings performance persists into the future. Francis et al. (2005) state that earnings quality is influenced by two types of factors:
those that reflect innate features of business models and operating environments, and those that reflect the financial reporting process. Dechow et al. (2010) set a framework for thinking about earnings quality: Reported earnings = f (X), where X is a firm's fundamental performance and f represents the accounting system that converts the unobservable X into observable earnings. Thus, earnings quality is impacted by both the firm's fundamental performance and the ability of the accounting system to measure performance.
In practice, earnings quality measures can be estimated using the firm-year specific method (Francis et al., 2004; Dechow and Schrand, 2002) . This method performs a time series regression and treats firm post earnings (or cash flow and accruals etc.) as benchmarks.
Alternatively, earnings quality measures are estimated using cross-sectional regression methods (McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Cornett et al. 2008 ). This method is based on industrial identification and treats the average of earnings (scaled by an indicator such as total assets) in the industry as a benchmark. The estimated coefficients (such as earnings persistence), forecasting errors (such as discretionary accruals) or adjusted R-squares (such as value relevance) generated in the regressions could represent earnings quality. Therefore, the deviation of current earnings from benchmark earnings, which is reflected in the parameters, is the key determinant of the level of earnings quality.
Because earnings quality is impacted by both the firm's fundamental performance and the accuracy of accounting in reporting this performance, it is possible that low earnings quality is accompanied with high corporate performance. Dechow and Schrand (2004) indicate that companies in growing industries will typically have high accruals and large estimation errors. High accruals and large estimation errors imply deviation of earnings from cash flow and underlying volatility in the company's operation, and thus low quality earnings.
In particular, companies with extensive growth options are likely to have low-quality earnings that are practically irrelevant for evaluating current performance and predicting future performance. Thus, we set up our research hypotheses: H1: In an emerging market experiencing an economic boom, it is possible that high corporate performance is associated with low earnings quality due to fluctuating growth. H2: Earnings management may distort earnings quality and manipulate corporate performance upwards. However, in an emerging market, earnings management is not necessarily the main driver of high corporate performance and low earnings quality.
H3: The association of low earnings quality with high corporate performance is probably an inherent phenomenon of an emerging market. Fast and fluctuating growth results in the coexistence of low earnings quality and high corporate performance in the emerging market of China.
The measures of earnings quality and corporate performance

The measures of earnings quality
Earnings quality can be measured from various dimensions. Schipper and Vincent (2003) propose several earnings quality measures, including earnings persistence, predictability, and variability, which are derived from time series properties of earnings. Francis et al. (2004) classify seven earnings quality measures as accounting-based or market-based, depending on the underlying assumptions and the data type used in the computation.
Based on current literature and data availability, this study employs the following four earnings quality measures: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and discretionary accrual. Kothari et al. (2005) indicate that earnings management most likely takes place at the end of the financial year, suggesting that the manipulation of accounting numbers occurs simultaneously across firms. Firms therefore are exposed to a clustering effect in total accruals. Thus, the cross-sectional method may dramatically reduce the efficiency of panel estimates. The firm-year specific method treats the firm as its own benchmark and mitigates concerns that differences between firms in a given industry give rise to noisy measures in the constructs (Francis et al. 2004) . Therefore, in this research all the earnings quality measures are estimated by the firm-year specific method and by a rolling five-year window.
Accruals quality
The gap between earnings and cash is accruals. Earnings that map more closely into cash flows are more desirable. One role of accruals is to shift or adjust the recognition of cash flows over time, so that the adjusted number can better reflect firm performance. The measure of accruals quality we use is based on Dechow and Dichev's (2002) model relating total current accruals to the lagged, current, and future cash flows from operations, represented as equation (1) 
Earnings persistence
Earnings persistence captures earnings sustainability, and thus persistent earnings are viewed as desirable because they are recurring (Francis et al. 2004) . To measure persistence, researchers generally conduct a regression of the future value of the variable on its current value (Dechow and Schrand 2004) . Kormendi and Lipe (1987) apply firm-level regressions on current earnings to estimate the earnings persistence. The present study employs the measure in Kormendi and Lipe (1987) 
Earnings predictability
Earnings predictability refers to the ability of earnings to be predicted in a time interval 
Discretionary accrual
Total accruals can be divided into nondiscretionary accruals (or normal accruals) and discretionary accruals (or abnormal accruals). Discretionary accruals are the component that cannot be explained by accounting fundamentals. The use of discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings quality is based on the view that discretionary accruals are not well explained by accounting fundamentals (fixed assets and revenues), and are inversely related to earnings quality (Francis et al. 2006 ).
In practice, the discretionary accruals are usually first estimated using Jones ' (1991) model to obtain the coefficients k1, k2, and k3; and then using a modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) to calculate nondiscretionary accruals. Finally, the difference between total accruals and nondiscretionary accruals is discretionary accruals, as represented in the equations (4), (5), and (6). 
where: TA j, t represents the total accruals of firm j in year t, which is equal to total current accruals plus depreciation; Rev j, t is the revenue of firm j in year t; PPE j, t is the gross property, plant and equipment; AR j, t is the accounting receivable of firm j in year t; NDA j, t represents nondiscretionary accruals; and DA j, t represents discretionary accruals.
Both positive and negative discretionary accruals that are significantly different from zero represent low earnings quality. To keep the description consistent, we use the absolute value (abs) of discretionary accruals as an earnings quality measure. Large (small) discretionary accruals (abs) equate to low (high) earnings quality.
The measures of corporate performance
We firstly employ four accounting-based measures of corporate performance. EBIT/assets (earnings before interest and tax scaled by assets) is a typical measure of profitability relative to total capital. It is commonly used to examine corporate performance (Cornett et al. 2008 ).
EBIT/sales is an alternative measure of profitability scaled by value of sales, and represents profitability in terms of a firm's activity of sales. Because EBIT consists of CFO and nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) and discretionary accruals (DA), managers can influence EBIT through their assumptions concerning accruals; that is, their manipulation of discretionary accruals. In order to obtain a performance measure that is relatively free from manipulation, we adopt an unmanaged performance measure that was put forward by Cornett et al. (2008): (EBIT − discretionary accruals)/assets or equivalently EBIT/assets − %DA.
Alternatively, we design another unmanaged performance measure that is (CFO + nondiscretionary accruals)/assets or equivalently, CFO/assets + %NDA 1 .
We further employ a market-based measure of corporate performance in a robustness test: Tobin-Q, which is a ratio of market value of equity plus net book value of liability to book value of equity plus net book value of liability. Because, there are tradable and nontradable shares for a majority of firms, we adopt two types of Tobin-Q. In Tobin-Q1, the market value of equity is the market price multiplied by total number of shares. In Tobin-Q2, the market value of equity is the market price multiplied by total number of shares plus book value of non-tradable shares.
Sample and summary statistics
Our initial sample comprises the firms that issued A shares and were listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges for at least six consecutive years from 1999 to 2010 2 .
We eliminate firms that have an incomplete data set and thus did not qualify for our analysis.
We eliminate financial firms, because they are subject to special regulations and are characterized by a unique capital structure. We also exclude firms classified by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as being "particular treatment" (PT) firms. PT firms are identified as having suffered a loss for three consecutive years and have heavy restrictions imposed on their reporting and share trading. Most PT firms are suspended from business, and further delisted or merged. However, we have included "special treatment" (ST)
firms. ST firms are identified as having experienced negative profit for two consecutive years, but are still allowed to continue operating like normal firms. Most ST firms recover from financial distress, but others may go on to become PT firms.
Since the calculation of earnings quality measures requires yearly increments or the prior year's data or both the prior and subsequent years' data, and the measures are generated by regression modellings in a rolling five-year window, the number of examinable In order to avoid extreme outliners, we follow the practice put forward by Francis et al. (2004) to winsorize the values of earnings quality measures, corporate performance measures, and control variables that are represented by ratios to the 99 percent and 1 percent values. Panel A of Table I presents descriptive statistics of earnings quality. As Cornett (2008) indicates, discretionary accruals must be reversed at some point. Due to the summation of positive and negative discretionary accruals generated from auto-regression, the average value should be near zero. The average discretionary accruals in our sample are small, at 0.51 percent of assets. The average absolute value of discretionary accruals is relatively large, at 6.76 percent of assets. Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The description of control variables is in section 4. Our initial sample comprises firms that issued A shares and were listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges for at least six consecutive years from 1999 to 2010. Since the calculation of earnings quality measures requires yearly increments or the prior year's data or both prior and subsequent years' data, and the measures are generated by regression modellings in a rolling five-year window, the number of examinable observations shrinks. The final sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year observations reported from 2004 to 2010, which constitutes an unbalanced panel data set.
All earnings quality measures have larger means than medians, with each having almost doubled in value. This implies that the values of earnings quality measures are right skewed.
The standard deviations of all earnings quality measures are larger than their means. For instance, the standard deviation of accruals quality is 0.0522, while its mean is 0.0418; the standard deviation of earnings persistence is 1.1334, while its mean is 0.3677. This large standard deviation indicates the high dispersion of earnings quality of Chinese listed firms. High earnings quality is related to low corporate performance, and can be viewed in most of the cells.
Empirical analyses
Model design
Earnings quality has an association with corporate performance. In addition to earnings quality, many factors impact on corporate performance and are associated with earnings quality. We chose several important factors as control variables to establish an environment commonly determined by those factors, so that we could insulate the effects of those variables from that of earnings quality.
Firm size is often selected as a control variable in research. On the one hand, firm size is related to operational efficiency and the ability to protect firms from risk. On the other hand, firm size is correlated with the amount of cash flow and accruals, which are inherently linked to earnings quality. We use total assets to represent firm size and the logarithm of total assets as an independent variable in our modelling.
Leverage is another popularly chosen control variable. Leverage represents the tradeoff between tax benefit and bankruptcy cost. In particular, the level of leverage reflects the firm's potential risk, and accordingly influences the firm's reporting and accrual accounting policies. The leverage here is the ratio of total liability to total assets.
The agency issue is always detected as a factor influencing corporate performance, financial reporting, and earnings quality, while ownership concentration is considered a determining factor of the agency issue. For example, one argument states that high ownership concentration can reduce agency costs by aligning the interests of owners and managers (Heugens et al., 2009; Vishny, 1986 and . We employ the ownership ratio of the five top shareholders as the proxy of ownership concentration.
Sustainable corporate development is essential for good corporate performance. Firms with contracted business find it difficult to achieve expected profitability. Managers also make discretionary accounting treatments in terms of their firms' prospects. When they forecast poorer business in the coming year, they may conduct earnings-decrease management in the current year and earnings-increase management in coming year, so that the earnings are smoothed to show a less volatile trend. We use the growth ratio of sales to represent the firm's growth potential.
We employ a dummy variable for firms that issued B shares, while their main equity sources are financed from the domestic A share market. Having foreign investors may mean that the corporate performance and earnings quality is different from those of fully domestically owned firms. We apply a dummy variable for ST firms. Both earnings quality and the corporate performance of ST firms are recognized as being low. We also apply a dummy variable for the state as the largest investor in a firm. State-controlled firms have been criticized for their low efficiency and for having more access to resources and markets.
We use a dummy variable to control for industry difference. CFO and accruals vary significantly from one industry to another. Industry type is an important concern in earnings management research. We also use a dummy variable to control for time differences and for possible macroeconomic policy changes.
The statistics of the controlling variables are summarized in panel C of 
where: i indicates a firm and t represents a year; P is a corporate performance measure that can be either an accounting-based on EBIT or a market-based on Tobin-Q ; Q is an earnings quality measure; F is a vector of a firm's characteristic variables that include firm size, leverage, ownership status, and so on; I is a vector of industry dummy variables in terms of industry classification promulgated by the Chinese Security Regulatory Committee in 1999;
Y is a vector of yearly dummy variables; and α, β 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 , and λ 4 are coefficients or vectors of relevant coefficients. The cluster effect in standard deviation of errors is corrected at the firm level. Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The description of control variables is in section 4. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year observations. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Initial empirical results
We replace the corporate performance measure EBIT/assets with EBIT/sales in our models and report on them in Table IV . The regressions of earnings scaled by sales are almost the same as the regressions of earnings scaled by assets: All coefficients of earnings quality are negative and at the 1% to 10% significance levels. The only difference worthy of notice is that the coefficients of the control variables state dummy and ownership concentration become insignificant. Overall the regression results in Tables III and IV provide empirical evidence that validates our hypothesis one: In an emerging market experiencing an economic boom it is possible that high corporate performance is associated with low earnings quality. 
Empirical results with unmanaged earnings
Low earnings quality associated with high corporate performance may be the consequence of managers' manipulation of earnings. Cornett et al. (2008) define EBIT/assets as a managed corporate performance measure, because it includes discretionary accruals that may be used by management to boost earnings. They employ an unmanaged corporate performance measure that subtracts discretionary accruals from earnings: EBIT/assets − %DA. In addition to borrowing sprite from Cornett et al., we introduce another unmanaged corporate performance measure: CFO/assets + %NDA. We substitute the managed performance measures with unmanaged performance measures in the models to see whether a change occurred in the association between earnings quality and corporate performance when the possible manipulation is removed. Table V shows the results of regression of EBIT/assets − %DA on earnings quality. Table V and Table III are directly comparable, because the only difference is the discretionary accruals removed from earnings in the dependent variable in Table V . Except that the coefficient of accruals quality becomes insignificant, all coefficients of other earnings quality measures, such as earnings persistence, earnings predictability and discretionary accruals (absolute value), are still negative and statistically significant at 1 to 10 percent convention levels. However, the coefficients become smaller in comparison with those in Table III , and the t-values also decrease in absolute value correspondingly. The negative association between earnings quality and corporate performance turns out to be weak when discretionary accruals are removed from managed earnings.
The results of regression of CFO/assets + %NDA on earnings quality are arranged in Table VI . By contrast to those in Table V , the coefficient of earnings persistence becomes insignificant, while the coefficient of accruals quality becomes significant. However, the signs, t-values and magnitudes of coefficients of other earnings quality measures and control variables are similar, i.e., the estimates in the two tables have no conclusive difference. Thus, we have twofold evidence shown in Tables III and IV for the relationship between earnings quality and managed corporate performance, and shown in Tables V and VI for the relationship between earnings quality and unmanaged corporate performance. Therefore, the empirical evidence supports our hypothesis two: Earnings management may distort earnings quality and manipulate corporate performance upwards to some extent. However, earnings management is not the main driver of high corporate performance and low earnings quality. Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The description of control variables is in section 4. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year observations. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The description of control variables is in section 4. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year observations. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Empirical results with earnings-increase and earnings-decrease management
We have detected negative relationships between earnings quality and corporate performance in the full sample. It has been suspected that earnings management distorts earnings quality and manipulates earnings upward, and thereby creates a negative association between earnings quality and corporate performance. However, earnings management may be earnings-increase management, in which discretionary accruals should be larger than zero (%DA>0), and earnings-decrease management, in which discretionary accruals should be smaller than zero (%DA≤0). If the negative association results from earnings management, earnings-increase management and earnings-decrease management should have different effects on corporate performance.
Next we tested whether the two opposite types of earnings management result in similar negative associations between earnings quality and corporate performance. To do so, we split the full sample into 3,979 firm-year observations with %DA>0, and 3,942 firm-year observations with %DA≤0. We ran all the models, except for model 4, for each group of firms. We did not run model 4, because its explanation variable is an absolute value of discretionary accruals. When the sample is structured in terms of positive or negative discretionary accruals, the regression coefficient of absolute value of discretionary accruals may be biased.
To save space, we here only report the estimated coefficients of earnings quality measures in Table VII . In the columns of %DA>0 and %DA≤0 under the dependent variables EBIT/assets and EBIT/sales, all the coefficients are negative and most of them are significant at the 1 to 10 percent levels. Although the absolute values of several earnings quality coefficients or levels of significance in the earnings-increase management columns are larger than those in earnings-decrease management columns, the others are just the opposite, so it is hard to generalize which type of earnings management leads to a more significant negative association between earnings quality and corporate performance.
Similarly, in the columns of %DA>0 and %DA≤0, under the dependent variables of unmanaged earnings EBIT/assets − %DA and CFO/assets + %NDA, all coefficients are negative and most of them are significant at the 1 to 10 percent levels. While we have removed the earnings management component, low earnings quality is still associated with high corporate performance regardless of the possible earnings-increase or earnings-decrease management.
Overall, the results in the columns of EBIT/assets, EBIT/sales, EBIT/assets − %DA and CFO/assets + %NDA in Table VI roughly match those in Tables III, IV, V, and VI respectively. The negative coefficients dominate the earnings quality measures in those tables-most of them significantly at convention levels. The negative association of earnings quality with corporate performance exists in both earnings-increase managed firms and earnings-decrease managed firms, which coincides with our hypothesis three: The association of low earnings quality with high corporate performance is probably an inherent phenomenon of an emerging market. Fast and fluctuating growth leads to the coexistence of low earnings quality and high corporate performance in the emerging market of China.
It seems that earnings-increase management manipulates earnings up and earningsdecrease management manipulates earnings down. Because both types of earnings management distort earnings quality, at the same level of earnings quality, firms with earnings-increase management should have relatively higher corporate performance than firms with earnings-decrease management. However, with firms conducting earningsincrease management this is just because their real earnings are lower than the expected level, whereas, with firms undertaking earnings-decrease management it is most likely that their real earnings are higher than the expected level (Healy 1985) . Thus the association of earnings quality and corporate performance is less determined by the direction of earnings management.
Further evidence with ST firms
We review the regression results presented in Tables III, IV , V, and VI and observe that the coefficients of the ST firm dummy variable in all models are negative at the 1 percent significance level. Therefore, it is true that ST firms display a low corporate performance.
However, the negative associations between earnings quality and corporate performance have been observed thoroughly in our empirical evidence. Does this mean that ST firms have higher earnings quality than normal firms? To answer this question, we test the differences between normal firms and ST firms in earnings quality and corporate performance. The summary of results is presented in Table VIII .
It can be seen that all the earnings quality measures of ST firms are lower than normal firms. Furthermore, the corporate performance measures of ST firms are much lower than those of normal firms. For example, the accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and discretionary accruals of ST firms are lower than those of normal firms by The performance of ST firms is much lower than normal firms, while the earnings quality of ST firms is lower or marginally higher than normal firms. Thus, the earnings quality of ST firms is relatively "better" than normal firms using their respective performance as a benchmark. We also repeat the regressions in models 1 to 6 for the samples with only ST firms, and only normal firms, respectively. We obtain all the negative coefficients of earnings quality measures, and most are statistically significant at the 5 percent or 10 percent levels.
The results are not reported here, but are available on request. This evidence also supports our two hypotheses. Although earnings management and financial distress draw earnings quality down, they are not the principal factors that determine the negative association between earnings quality and corporate performance. The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The description of control variables is in section 4. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year observations of which 1,068 are on ST firms and 6,853 are on normal firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Robustness tests
In the robustness tests, we replace the accounting-based measures of corporate performance with the market-based measure of corporate performance Tobin-Q. Table IX represents the results of regression on Tobin-Q1, which is the ratio of market value of total shares outstanding plus net book value of liability divided by book value of equity plus net book value of liability. If we compare Table IX with Tables III to IV Interestingly, the coefficients and significance levels of several control variables in Table IX are different from the relevant ones in Tables III to VI . For example, the firm size (Logarithm of assets) has a negative coefficient in Table IX, while it has positive coefficients in Tables III to VI . The negative coefficient of firm size in Table IX is probably evidence of the small firm effect put forward by Fama and MacBeth (1973) . The coefficient of ST firm is positive in Table IX, but negative in Tables III to VI . The reason is that when a firm is becoming distressed before falling into the ST category, the market evaluates this firm negatively. When a firm has been classified ST, the possibility of, or released news regarding, merger, restructure and government assistance always pushes the market price up. The difference in the coefficients of other relevant control variables between regressions of accounting-based measures and market-based measures may be explained by market efficiency and behavioural finance theories, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The description of control variables is in section 4. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year observations. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Table X represents the results of regression on Tobin-Q2. The equity value is the market value of total shares in the numerator of Tobin-Q1, whereas the equity value is the market value of tradable shares plus book value of nontradable shares in the numerator of Tobin-Q2. Tobin-Q1 may overstate market performance and the Tobin-Q2 may understate market performance, considering that equity market value is higher than equity book value overall. Nevertheless, the coefficients of earnings quality measures in Table X are similar to those in Table IX , regardless of the difference in some control variables. Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The description of control variables is in section 4. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year observations. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
In the robustness tests, we also follow the approach of Francis et al. (2004) in ranking the value of each quality each year to form deciles. Because high raw values of accruals quality, earnings predictability, earnings smoothness, and discretionary accruals correspond to low earnings quality, we rank the deciles for these four measures in descending order.
Meanwhile, because high raw values in earnings persistence correspond to high earnings quality, we rank the deciles for earnings persistence in ascending order. Thus, a firm in the top decile (decile 10) has the highest earnings quality, and a firm in the bottom decile (decile 1) has the lowest earnings quality.
We replaced the values of each earnings quality measure with relevant deciles and then repeated the regression analyses. The results by decile-approach are somewhat dissimilar to those by value-approach in Tables III to VIII . First, the significance of many coefficients of earnings quality measure declines, but most are still at the convention level of 10 percent or 5 percent. Second, the signs of a few coefficients change. For example, with the regression of EBIT/assets, the coefficient t-values of accruals quality and earnings persistence decrease in absolute value from −1.96 to −1.78, and from −4.44 to −2.11 respectively. With the regression of EBIT/sales, the coefficient t-value of absolute discretionary accruals becomes 1.12 from a previous −1.88. However, negative and statistically significant at convention levels are the main characteristics of the coefficients of earnings quality measures in the regressions that use deciles. The prior detected negative association between earnings quality and corporate performance still holds in the robustness tests ─ it does not qualitatively change. To save space, we do not report the robustness test results here, but they are available on request.
Finally, we borrow the spirit of Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2005) , which decomposes accruals quality into innate accruals quality (InnateAQ) and discretionary accruals quality (DisAQ). The innateAQ is derived from firms' operational characteristics represented by firms' innate factors: firm size, standard deviation of cash flow, standard deviation of sales revenues, length of operating cycle and the appearances of negative earnings. We conduct regression of accruals quality on firms' innate factors and obtain the fitted value of innateAQ 3 . We, therefore, repeat the regression of the model by replacing earnings quality measures with the innateAQ. We find that the innateAQ is positive in the regression on managed earnings (EBIT/assets and EBIT/sales) and negative in the regression on unmanaged earnings (CFO/assets + %NDA and EBIT/assets -%DA). In particular, the coefficients of EBIT/sales and EBIT/assets -%DA are statistically at 1% significance. The results imply that firms' operating characteristics may be negative to earnings quality in the Chinese context in which firms have high growth in sales and earnings, which is likely to be consistent with our main argument.
Conclusion
Earnings quality is an important concern for managers and investors because it conveys information about firms' operational and financial status. The mainstream of theoretical analyses asserts that earnings quality has a positive association with corporate performance.
Low earnings quality implies either high risk, which increases the cost of capital, or information bias, which leads to incorrect managerial decisions. However, empirical evidence does not always support the theoretical conclusion (Chan et al., 2006; Penman and Zhang, 2002) . In particular, we find a negative association with corporate performance for publicly listed companies in the Chinese market.
To obtain reliable evidence, we employ four attributes of earnings as earnings quality measures: accruals quality, earnings persistence, predictability and discretionary accruals. We use four corporate performance measures: earnings before interest and tax scaled by total assets, earnings before interest and tax scaled by sales, earnings before interest and tax less discretionary accruals then scaled by total assets, and cash flow plus nondiscretionary accruals then scaled by total assets. The last two corporate performance measures are assumed to exclude the earnings management effect.
Our regression results show that, when the corporate performance measures include discretionary accruals, the earnings management component, all the coefficients of the earnings quality measures are negative and significant at the convention level. When the effect of the earnings management component is removed from the corporate performance measures, three out of four coefficients of the earnings quality measures are negative and significant at convention levels. Our further analyses on the subsamples of earnings-increase management firms and earnings-decrease management firms, as well as financially distressed (ST) firms, provide almost consistent results. The robustness tests using the market-based performance measure of Tobin-Q, and using the decile ranking of earnings quality, do not generate significantly different results.
The negative association of earnings quality with corporate performance seems a puzzle in terms of the most frequently cited literature. We argue that earnings quality is a joint function of financial reporting accuracy and fundamental corporate performance (Dechow et al., 2010) . In particular, the earnings quality measures represented by the coefficients and In an emerging market experiencing an economic boom, many firms experience high volatility and rapid growth of earnings. Although earnings management is likely used to inflate earnings upwards for some firms, earnings management is not the primary cause of the negative association between earnings quality and corporate performance. Instead, the highly volatile and rapid growth of firms' earnings is the main driver of the negative association of earnings quality with corporate performance. Low earnings quality and high corporate performance are an inherent phenomenon in a period of fast economic development in the emerging market of China.
Notes:
1 Theoretically, because EBIT = CFO + nondiscretionary accruals + discretionary accruals, then EBIT/assets − %DA = CFO/assets + %NDA. Actually, due to the time variance of accounting data entries and accounting issues recognition, EBIT/assets − %DA is not equal to CFO/assets + %NDA. However, they are closely correlated. We employed both for more robust evidence. 
